This paper challenges the widely accepted stylized fact that chief executive officers (CEOs) in the United States are paid significantly more than their foreign counterparts. Using CEO pay data across fourteen countries with mandated pay disclosures, we show that the U.S. pay premium is economically modest and primarily reflects the performance-based pay demanded by institutional shareholders and independent boards. Indeed, we find no significant difference in either level of CEO pay or the use of equity-based pay between U.S. and non-U.S. firms exposed to international and U.S. capital, product, and labor markets. We also show that U.S. and non-U.S. CEO pay has largely converged in the 2000s. (JEL G32, G34, G38) One of the most widely accepted stylized facts in the executive compensation literature is that chief executive officers (CEOs) in the United States are paid significantly more than their foreign counterparts (e.g., Abowd and
incentive pay. Moreover, to the extent that insider ownership is high because of CEO ownership, such executives are rewarded and motivated primarily by their ownership and not their pay. We also control for the effects of CEO characteristics (e.g., age, tenure, education, past experience), concluding that these factors do not help explain international differences in pay.
We also find that U.S. CEOs receive a higher fraction of their compensation in the form of stock and options. Risk-averse CEOs will naturally demand a pay premium for accepting the increased risk of equity-based pay (e.g., Hall and Murphy 2002) . Our 26% U.S. pay premium estimate is therefore not the appropriate measure of international pay differences from the perspective of risk-averse and undiversified CEOs who presumably do not hedge the risk of their pay packages and who are directly or indirectly forced to hold an undiversified portfolio (laden with unvested company stock and options). We estimate risk-adjusted CEO pay using two alternative approaches: (i) the riskless amount of compensation CEOs would accept in exchange for their risky compensation (Hall and Murphy 2002) , and (ii) observed compensation less the risk premium CEOs would demand for holding an undiversified portfolio (Conyon, Core, and Guay 2011) . We find that risk adjustments reduce but do not eliminate observed U.S. pay premiums unless we also control for differences in ownership and board structures.
We then explore the factors contributing to the convergence of CEO pay practices internationally. Many of the firms in our non-U.S. sample compete in the global market for capital, customers, and managerial talent. We show that there is not a significant difference in CEO pay between U.S. firms and non-U.S. firms exposed to international markets. We classify non-U.S. firms as "Internationalized" if they are included in the Morgan Stanley Capital International (MSCI) All Country World Index or have a high fraction of shares held by foreign investors. Similarly, the difference is insignificant when U.S. firms are compared with non-U.S. firms that have a high fraction of foreign sales and internationally diverse boards. Additionally, we show that for "Americanized" non-U.S. firms exposed to U.S. capital markets (firms cross-listed in U.S. exchanges and with a high fraction of shares held by U.S. institutions) and product and labor markets (firms that have acquired assets in the United States and firms with a high fraction of directors who also sit on boards of U.S. firms), the CEO pay is similar to that of U.S. CEOs.
We argue that these non-U.S. firms implement U.S.-style compensation packages to attract global managerial talent, customers, and investors. Foreign firms attempting to attract executives in competition with equivalent U.S. firms will need to offer packages that are competitive with U.S. levels, including large grants of stock and options and high overall levels of expected total compensation. Moreover, companies cross-listed on U.S. exchanges benefit from "bonding" themselves to legal, regulatory, and capital market requirements of the United States (Doidge, Karolyi, and Stulz 2004) . One of those mechanisms could be implementing U.S.-style compensation packages 2006 fiscal year CEO pay data extracted from S&P's ExecuComp database (U.S.), BoardEx (non-U.S.) (collectively "BoardEx & Exec" in the table), or hand-collected from corporate filings. "% of Market Cap" is computed for each country as the market capitalization of firms with CEO pay data divided by the total market capitalization of firms in Worldscope. We exclude CEOs in their first years to compute the CEO pay statistics. CEO Total Pay is defined as the sum of salaries, bonuses (including all non-equity incentives), benefits, and grant-date values for stock options, restricted stock, and performance shares.
EU members (in addition to the United Kingdom and Ireland) had mandated CEO-level disclosure: Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, and Sweden. In addition, although not in the EU, Norway also adopted EU-style disclosure rules, and Switzerland demanded similar disclosure for the "highestpaid" executive.
Data sources
In this paper, we use data from the recently expanded disclosure rules to conduct a comprehensive international comparative analysis of the compensation for CEOs in all countries with detailed individual disclosure of CEO pay. 4 Table 1 reports the sample size and sources for the data, as well as summary statistics for the level and structure of CEO pay in each country. Our primary data source on compensation for U.S. CEOs is Standard and Poor's (S&P's) ExecuComp database, while our primary source for CEOs of firms based outside the United States is BoardEx, compiled by the U.K.-based firm Management Diagnostics Limited. Together, these two sources (identified as "BoardEx & Exec" in Table 1 ) account for 2,899 of the 3,263 firms in our sample. BoardEx is the leading database on board composition of publicly listed firms, and it includes detailed biographic information on individual executives and board members in nearly fifty countries, including countries that do not have mandatory disclosure requirements for executive compensation. In addition to providing biographic information, BoardEx also includes detailed compensation data for top executives-including salaries, other pay, bonuses, payouts under long-term plans, option grants, and share grants.
To supplement the BoardEx data, we manually collect 2006 pay data from company filings for the largest firms in countries with pay-disclosure requirements but low BoardEx coverage, using annual reports, proxy statements (or their equivalent, such as management information circulars in Canada), and SEC Form 20F for foreign companies that are cross-listed in the United States. Specifically, we built a sample of firms in each country to ensure that we could cover at least the thirty largest publicly listed firms in that country ranked by market capitalization, or a cumulative 80% of that country's stock market capitalization in 2006. For Australia, Canada, and South Africa (where BoardEx has coverage on board composition and biographical information but scanty pay data), we manually collect compensation data. For our manually collected data, we value stock grants using the grant-date market value and option grants using the grant-date Black-Scholes value. 5 Ultimately, as reported in Table 1 , 364 firms with manually collected data are included in our final sample.
For U.S. firms, we use ExecuComp rather than data from BoardEx to maintain comparability with the existing literature on U.S. CEO pay. However, two aspects of BoardEx's compensation calculation deserve special mention. First, instead of providing grant-date values for stock option grants, as in ExecuComp and our manually collected data, BoardEx computes the value of options granted using the closing stock price on the last trading day of the fiscal year rather than the stock price on the grant date. Since 2006 was a generally positive year for stock markets in the countries included in our study, valuing options using fiscal year-end stock prices (à la BoardEx) produces a slightly higher value than using grant-date prices. Second, for performance share plans (in which the number of restricted shares awarded is based on realized performance), BoardEx computes the value based on the maximum (rather than the target or minimum) shares that can be awarded under the plan, again multiplied by the end-of-fiscal-year closing stock price. In unreported results, we find that measuring pay for U.S. CEOs using BoardEx rather than ExecuComp does not alter the main findings of our study. 5 In valuing options, we use the company-reported fair value if available, and otherwise follow ExecuComp's pre-2006 valuation methodology as closely as possible. In particular, options are valued using the Black and Scholes (1973) formula with the following inputs: (i) standard deviation of sixty-month stock returns (or as many months as possible) for the volatility; (ii) average three-year dividend yield; (iii) risk-free rate on government bonds issued in each country with a maturity approximating 70% of the option maturity; (iv) exercise price equals market price; and (v) expiration date of 70% of the full maturity (as a partial adjustment for early exercise).
We exclude firms without complete compensation data, and we also exclude firms that cannot be matched to Worldscope, which is our source for firm financial and stock market data. We match the firms in our sample to Worldscope using CUSIP codes for U.S. firms and SEDOL or ISIN codes for non-U.S. firms, and finally manually using company names. Finally, to reduce the impact of BoardEx's oversampling of small U.K. firms, we restrict our analysis to companies with 2005 revenues in excess of $100 million. As reported in Table 1 , after these exclusions, our final sample consists of 1,648 U.S. CEOs and 1,615 CEOs from thirteen countries outside the United States. Our sample firms accounted for approximately 90% of the market capitalization of all Worldscope-covered firms in the United States, and 83% of the market capitalization of all Worldscope-covered firms in the thirteen non-U.S. countries.
In our analyses of CEO pay in Table 1 (and all our regression analyses below), we exclude 116 U.S. and 135 non-U.S. CEOs serving in their first year to avoid data anomalies reflecting compensation for multiple positions for CEOs promoted internally, and partial-year compensation and signing bonuses or grants for CEOs hired from outside. Therefore, our analyses below are based on a final sample of 1,532 U.S. CEOs and 1,480 non-U.S. CEOs. 6 Table 1 also reports the summary statistics of the level and structure of CEO pay in each country. All monetary values are converted into U.S. dollars using the relevant exchange rate as of the close of the year. We find our primary findings to be unaffected when we use the purchasing power parity (PPP) factor in 2006 to adjust CEO pay or measure total pay relative to the average worker wage in each country. As shown in Table 1 , the average and median pay for U.S. CEOs ($5.5 million and $3.3 million, respectively) is about double the average and median pay for non-U.S. CEOs ($2.8 million and $1.6 million, respectively). Salaries account for 28% of total pay for CEOs in the United States, a smaller portion of that in any other country. The average across the other countries is 46%. Similarly, equity-based pay (consisting of restricted stock, stock options, and performance shares) accounts, on average, for 39% of total pay for U.S. CEOs, a higher percentage than in any other country. The non-U.S. average is 22%. The differences in the level and structure of pay for U.S. versus non-U.S. CEOs in Table 1 are all highly statistically significant.
The Level and Structure of Pay for U.S. and Non-U.S. CEOs

The U.S. pay premium
The summary statistics in Table 1 suggest that U.S. CEOs receive about double the pay of their foreign counterparts, but this calculation does not control for industry and especially firm size, documented to be an important determinant of the level of executive compensation (Baker, Jensen, and Murphy 1988; Kostiuk 1990; Murphy 1999) . In addition to industry and firm size, we consider four groups of potential controls: firm characteristics empirically known to affect the level of CEO pay based on prior evidence in U.S. studies, ownership characteristics known to be systematically different in U.S. versus non-U.S. firms, board characteristics also systematically different in U.S. versus non-U.S. firms, and individual CEO characteristics. Detailed descriptions and data sources for these variables are included in Table A1 (see Appendix) , and summary statistics by country are provided in Table A2 (see Appendix) . We winsorize some firm-level variables (leverage, Tobin's q, and stock return volatility) at the 1% level. Table 2 reports averages for the control variables in U.S. and non-U.S. firms, along with the t-statistic testing the difference in means between the two samples. As shown in the table, the U.S. firms in our sample are not significantly larger than the non-U.S. firms, but they are less leveraged and have higher stock price volatilities and Tobin's q. In addition, insider ownership (by executives, directors, and large blockholders) is significantly lower in the United States, while institutional ownership is significantly higher in the United States. American boards are slightly smaller and significantly more independent, but they are much more likely to have CEOs who also assume the title of chairman. In terms of CEO characteristics, when compared with non-U.S. CEOs, the U.S. CEOs tend to be older, more experienced, better educated, and more likely to have been promoted into their positions rather than hired externally. Table 3 presents results examining the U.S. pay premium after controlling for firm, ownership, and board characteristics. In columns (1)-(4), we estimate the following cross-sectional regression on 2006 CEO pay levels: Log(Total Pay i ) = α +β 1 (US dummy)+β 2 (Firm characteristics i )
+β 3 (Industry dummies)+ε i .
Our main variable of interest is the "U.S. dummy," which evaluates the paylevel differential of U.S.-based top executives over those from other countries. The OLS regression includes fixed effects for twelve Fama-French industries, and standard errors are clustered at the country level to take into account the fact that residuals may not be independent within a country. 7 Column (1) of Table 3 reports the results from estimating Equation (1) controlling only for industry and prior-year sales, similar in spirit to the surveybased estimates from Towers Perrin. 8 There is a strong theoretical justification for a positive relation between CEO pay and firm size. Rosen (1981 Rosen ( , 1982 argues that the marginal product of managerial ability increases with firm size, so it is optimal to assign the most talented managers to the largest firms. Such "assortative matching" produces equilibrium wages that are convex in ability, such that small increases in ability can lead to large increases in wages. Gabaix and Landier (2008) extend Rosen's model by showing that the equilibrium wage of a CEO will depend not only on firm size, but also on the size distribution of all firms in the relevant market: as the average firm becomes larger, competition for scarce managerial talent will bid up compensation. In column (1) of Table 3 , the CEO pay-firm size elasticity is 0.406 (with a t-statistic of 17.44), which is in line with estimates in prior studies. The coefficient on the U.S. dummy of 0.582 (with a t-statistic of 4.14) implies that predicted CEO pay is 79% (i.e., e 0.582 −1) higher in the United States than in other countries after controlling for size and industry. 9 The R 2 of 0.35 indicates that more than a third of the variation in CEO compensation across the fourteen countries is explained by size, industry, and whether or not the firm is located in the United States.
In column (2) of Table 3 we introduce other (prior-year) firm-level characteristics routinely used in CEO pay regressions and similar to those used in the U.S.-U.K. comparisons by Conyon and Murphy (2000) and Table 3 Regressions of the level and structure of CEO pay on firm characteristics, ownership, and board structure Conyon, Core, and Guay (2011) : leverage, Tobin's q, stock-return volatility, and stock returns. CEO pay is typically expected to be positively related to Tobin's q, using the latter as either a measure of investment opportunities (requiring a more capable CEO and riskier pay, both which will increase pay) or an indicator of past performance (leading to a higher level of pay for CEOs contributing to that performance). The volatility of stock returns is typically expected to be positively related to pay, since CEOs may demand risk premiums for serving in riskier environments. 10 Similarly, leverage increases the riskiness of equity-based compensation, also leading to risk premiums and higher levels of CEO pay. Finally, stock returns are included to capture the expected effect of prior-year performance on current pay levels. 11 As shown in column (2) of Table 3 , CEO pay is positively and significantly related to leverage, Tobin's q, and stock returns (as expected), and negatively and significantly related to the volatility of stock returns. Moreover, the coefficient on the U.S. dummy of 0.629 in column (2) suggests an implied U.S. pay premium of 88%, which is higher than the 79% premium when controlling only for sales and industry. Therefore, the U.S. pay premium is apparently not explained by differences in capital structure, growth opportunities, performance, and volatility.
Column (3) of Table 3 includes controls for ownership structure. As we have noted in Table 2 , insiders hold a larger fraction of the shares in non-U.S. firms than in U.S. firms, reflecting the relative importance of family-or government-controlled firms outside the United States (La Porta et al. 1999 ). We expect a negative relation between CEO pay and insider ownership for two reasons. First, to the extent that insider ownership is high because of CEO ownership, such executives are primarily rewarded and motivated by their ownership and not by their compensation. Second, to the extent that insider ownership is high because of large blockholders, they can monitor and direct the activities of executives without relying on (expensive) incentive compensation.
While insider ownership is higher outside the United States, Table 2 shows that institutions hold a significantly larger fraction of the shares in U.S. firms than in non-U.S. firms. We expect that institutions will press for tighter links between pay and shareholder performance (which will generally raise pay), and therefore we expect a positive relation between CEO pay and institutional 10 In fact, the relation between volatility and pay is theoretically ambiguous. If the volatility reflects noise in the CEO's effect on firm performance, then higher volatility will lead to lower pay-performance sensitivities, which can lead to either higher or lower variability of CEO pay (which in turn will affect expected pay); see Lazear and Rosen (1981) . However, if the volatility reflects volatility in CEO marginal productivities, CEOs in more volatile environments will have higher pay-performance sensitivities and higher average pay (Zábojník 1996; Prendergast 2002; Edmans and Gabaix 2011) . In addition, our definition of total compensation includes the Black-Scholes value of options, providing a potential mechanical link between volatility and pay.
11 The coefficient on this variable does not measure the relation between pay and performance (since that would require either a time series of data on realized compensation or measures of the portfolio of stock and option holdings).
ownership. Hartzell and Starks (2003) focus on the concentration of institutional holdings (the fraction held by the top five institutions) and find that higher concentration is associated with higher use of equity-based compensation, which they interpret as evidence that institutions play a monitoring role. As shown in column (3) of Table 3 , CEO pay is negatively related to insider ownership, and positively related to institutional ownership. In particular, the coefficients on the ownership variables suggest that a 10% increase in insider and institutional holdings is associated with an 8% decrease and 4% increase in CEO pay, respectively. Coupled with our results in columns (5) and (6) (discussed below) that the use of equity-based incentive compensation decreases with insider holdings and increases with institutional holdings, these results are consistent with the interpretation that insider holdings substitute for equity-based pay, while institutions press for higher pay for performance. Moreover, controlling for ownership structure reduces the coefficient on the U.S. dummy to 0.268, implying a reduction in the U.S. pay premium from 88% in column (2) to 31% in column (3).
Although both insider ownership and institutional ownership are significant determinants of the level of CEO pay, untabulated results suggest that institutional ownership accounts for most of the decline in the estimated U.S. pay premium between column (2) and column (3) of Table 3 . In particular, adding only insider ownership to column (2) reduces the coefficient on the U.S. dummy variable from 0.629 to 0.495 (suggesting a reduction in the U.S. pay premium from 88% to 64%), while adding only institutional ownership reduces the coefficient from 0.629 to 0.330 (a reduction in the U.S. pay premium from 88% to 39%).
Column (4) of Table 3 includes controls for board structure, also seen in Table 2 to differ significantly between U.S. and non-U.S. firms. 12 The theoretical prediction of the effect of the composition of the board on CEO pay is somewhat ambiguous, depending on whether a heavier reliance on independent and experienced boards will reduce pay through more effective monitoring, or increase pay through increased reliance on incentive compensation. As shown in column (4), we find that CEO pay is positively related both to the fraction of independent directors on the board and to the average number of boards on which directors sit. 13 Controlling for board structure (in addition to firm and ownership characteristics) reduces the coefficient on the U.S. dummy to 0.230, implying a U.S. pay premium of 26%. Adding only board-structure variables to column (2) reduces the U.S. pay premium from 88% to 66%. Figure 1 shows the distribution of predicted CEO pay across different countries for a hypothetical firm with $1 billion in sales. Panel A, in the spirit of the Towers Perrin estimates, controls only for firm size and industry, based on the specification in column (1) of Table 3 with the "U.S. dummy" replaced by a set of fourteen country dummies. Panel B controls for industry, firm characteristics, ownership, and board characteristics, based on the specification in column (4) of Table 3 . The pay composition percentages are defined as the average composition across all CEOs for each country based on Table 1 . Panel A shows that U.S. CEOs earn substantially more than non-U.S. CEOs controlling only for size and industry. However, in Panel B, after controlling for firm, ownership, and board characteristics, we find effective parity in CEO pay levels among Anglo-Saxon nations (United States, United Kingdom, Ireland, Australia, and Canada) and also Germany, Italy, and Switzerland.
In addition, we also consider differences in individual CEO characteristics as suggested by Table 2 , such as age, tenure, external hire dummy, and college degree dummy. Column (1) of Table 4 analyzes differences in pay levels and structures for U.S. and non-U.S. CEOs after controlling for CEO characteristics, in addition to all the firm, ownership, and board characteristics (coefficients not shown) as in column (4) of Table 3 . We measure CEO characteristics based on employment histories and personal attributes contained in BoardEx. The sample size is slightly reduced because individual CEO characteristics are not available for some of our hand-collected compensation data in Canada, Australia, and South Africa. Data definitions for these variables are provided in Table A1 (see  Appendix) . Column (1) shows that the CEO characteristics, taken individually and jointly using an F -test, are not significantly related to the level of CEO pay. The implied U.S. pay premium of 25% in column (1) of Table 4 is essentially unchanged compared with the 26% premium estimated in column (4) of Table 3 . Given the statistical insignificance of CEO characteristics-coupled with the reduction in available observations-we ignore CEO characteristics throughout the remainder of the paper.
The U.S. equity pay premium
One of the primary determinants of CEO expected pay levels is the riskiness of the pay package, which is captured only indirectly by firm and industry characteristics in Equation (1). As discussed in detail in Section 2.3 below, we expect that CEOs at companies with riskier pay will receive higher expected levels of pay to compensate for the increased risk. In columns (5) and (6) (1) of Table 3 ). Panel B controls for sales, industry, and firm, ownership, and board characteristics (as in column (4) of Table 3 ). The "non-U.S. average" is weighted by the number of firms in each country. The pay composition percentages are defined as the average composition across all CEOs for each country from Table 3 , column (4) (coefficients not shown), with additional controls for CEO characteristics. Regressions also include industry dummy variables based on twelve Fama-French industries. Variable definitions and sources are in Table A1 (see Appendix) . Robust t-statistics in parentheses are based on standard errors clustered by country. * * * , * * , * denote that the coefficient is significant at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.
where "Equity Pay" is defined as the grant-date value of stock and options, and firm characteristics are the same as in column (4) of Table 3 . Similar to columns (1)-(4) of Table 3 , the Tobit regressions include controls for twelve Fama-French industries with standard errors clustered at the country level. As in our earlier regressions, our main variable of interest is the "U.S. dummy," which evaluates the difference in the use of incentive pay for U.S. and non-U.S. CEOs; we call the coefficient on this dummy variable the "U.S. equity pay premium." Column (5) of Table 3 , which controls only for industry and firm size, suggests a U.S. equity pay premium of 22%. This is slightly larger than the 17% implied from the summary statistics in Table 1 , where equitybased pay accounted for 39% and 22% of total pay for U.S. and non-U.S. firms, respectively. However, after controlling for firm, ownership, and board characteristics in column (6) of Table 3 , the U.S. equity pay premium falls to a statistically insignificant 6%, implying only a relatively modest increased use of equity-based pay for U.S. CEOs. Moreover, column (6) shows that the firm characteristics associated with higher pay are generally also associated with a higher use of performance-based compensation. Importantly, both the level of CEO pay and the use of incentive compensation are positively related to institutional ownership and the fraction of independent directors, and negatively related to insider ownership. Combined with the results in columns (3) and (4), these findings suggest that the reduction in the U.S. pay premium comes from the performance-based pay demanded by institutional shareholders and more independent boards.
Columns (7) and (8) of Table 3 decompose equity pay into its components: compensation in the form of stock and stock options. We find that there is no statistically significant difference between U.S. and non-U.S. CEOs in terms of use of stock but there is a significantly higher use of stock options for U.S. CEOs, even after controlling for firm, ownership, and board characteristics.
Column (2) of Table 4 analyzes the differences in U.S. and non-U.S. pay structures after controlling additionally for individual CEO characteristics. Older CEOs receive less of their compensation in the form of stock and options, while more educated CEOs receive more equity-based pay; none of the other CEO characteristics are significantly related to the structure of pay. The coefficient on the U.S. dummy is insignificant.
Risk-adjusted CEO pay
In comparing the level of CEO pay across companies and countries, it is important to distinguish between two different valuation concepts: the cost to the company of granting the compensation and the value to the CEO from receiving that compensation. Our measure of total compensation is meant to approximate the grant-date opportunity cost to shareholders of the CEO's pay package. However, it does not approximate the value of the package from the perspective of a risk-averse and undiversified CEO who presumably does not hedge the risk of the package. Although the 2006 pay differences for U.S. versus non-U.S. CEOs are economically modest after controlling for firm, ownership, and board characteristics, the results in Table 3 nonetheless suggest that U.S. CEOs are paid more than their foreign counterparts and receive a greater share of their compensation in equity-based compensation. Since risk-averse CEOs will naturally demand a "risk premium" for accepting stock or stock options in lieu of safer forms of compensation, it is possible that part of the U.S. pay premium reflects a compensating differential for the increased risk of U.S. pay packages. Indeed, Conyon, Core, and Guay (2011) conclude that adjusting for risk plausibly explains the observed 2003 pay differences between U.S. and U.K. CEOs.
While there is general agreement that risk-averse CEOs will demand a premium for accepting risky compensation, there is no single accepted methodology on how to measure the risk premium. Following Lambert, Larcker, and Verrecchia (1991) , Hall and Murphy (2002) propose measuring the value of nontradable stock or options to an undiversified risk-averse CEO as the amount of riskless cash compensation the CEO would exchange for the stock or options, based on various assumptions regarding CEO risk aversion and outside wealth. Applying this method to our data allows us to create a measure of "risk-adjusted CEO pay" that can be compared across companies and countries.
As an alternative experiment, Conyon, Core, and Guay (2011) propose measuring the risk premium that CEOs would demand when the CEO is directly or indirectly forced to hold a undiversified portfolio (laden with company stock and options) rather than an unconstrained portfolio with the same expected value. The risk premium is defined as the amount of riskless cash compensation that would make the CEO indifferent between holding the undiversified portfolio (with the cash) and an unconstrained portfolio (based again on various assumptions regarding CEO risk aversion and outside wealth). Risk-adjusted pay under this framework is defined as observed total compensation less the estimated risk premium.
The difference between these two approaches for measuring risk-adjusted pay is best illustrated by a CEO who receives a base salary and no other forms of compensation. Under the Hall and Murphy (2002) approach, the CEO's riskadjusted pay is simply his (unadjusted) base salary. Under the Conyon, Core, and Guay (2011) approach, the CEO's risk-adjusted pay is his base salary less the risk premium expected for holding an undiversified portfolio.
Which of these two approaches is "right" depends, in part, on how the CEO acquired his portfolio of company stock and options. Suppose, for example, that as a condition of employment, the CEO is required to use personal funds to purchase company shares. In this case, the company will need to pay a risk premium to the CEO on top of what would otherwise be a competitive pay package to compensate for the CEO's shareholding requirement. At the other extreme, suppose the CEO's outstanding options were the result of generous grants made with only slight reductions in other components of (already competitive) pay. In this case, there is no reason for the CEO to expect to be paid an ongoing risk premium for holding an undiversified portfolio. Hall and Murphy (2002) , suppose that a CEO has non-firm-related wealth of w, holds a portfolio S(·) of company shares and options, and is granted n options to buy n shares of stock at exercise price X in T years. Assuming that w is invested at the risk-free rate, r f , and that the realized stock price at T is P T , the CEO's wealth at time T is given by 14
Hall-Murphy risk adjustment. Following
If, instead of the option, the CEO were awarded V in cash that he invested at the risk-free rate, his wealth at time T would be
Assuming that the CEO's utility over wealth is U (W ), we can define the CEO's value of n options as the "certainty equivalent" V that equates expected utilities (3) and (4):
Solving (5) numerically requires assumptions about the form of the utility function, U (W ), and the distribution of future stock prices, f (P T ). We follow Hall and Murphy (2002) in assuming that the CEO has constant relative risk aversion ρ, so that U (W ) ≡ ln(W ) when ρ = 1, and U (W ) ≡ 1 1−ρ W 1−ρ when ρ = 1. We adopt the capital asset pricing model and assume that the distribution of stock prices in T years is lognormal with volatility σ and expected return value equal to (r f +β(r m −r f )−σ 2 /2)T , where β is the firm's systematic risk and r m is the return on the market portfolio. 15 To solve for certainty-equivalent values, we extract BoardEx and ExecuComp data on the "total wealth" of the CEO (defined as the market value of stock held plus the intrinsic "in-the-money" value of options held at fiscal year-end). We manually collect similar data for firms in Australia, Canada, and South Africa. We make several simplifying assumptions. First, we assume that both restricted stock and option grants have a vesting term of five years (equal to the average and median "expected term" for option grants in our U.S. sample). Second, we assume that the CEO holds shares equal to total wealth divided by the year-end share price, and further assume that these shares will be held for exactly five years. 16 We find that U.S. CEOs have substantially more wealth tied up in their firms, with stock and option holdings being on average over nine times their compensation, while the equivalent multiple is only three for non-U.S. CEOs. Assuming that U.S. CEOs are no less risk averse than their foreign counterparts, these wealth data suggest larger risk adjustments for U.S. CEOs than non-U.S. CEOs, which in turn will reduce the estimated U.S. pay premium. For other inputs, we assume a market risk premium of 6.5% and use local risk-free rates for seven-to ten-year government bonds, and for each firm, we calculate the three-year dividend yield and standard deviation using the last thirty-six months of stock returns. Finally, following Hall and Murphy (2002) , we assume that CEOs have relative risk-aversion parameters of two or three, and that each CEO has "safe wealth" equal to the greater of $5 million or four times the current cash compensation.
Panel A of Table 5 shows how the observed U.S. premium decreases when CEO pay is measured on a risk-adjusted basis following the Hall and Murphy (2002) methodology. Columns (1) and (2) of Table 5 replicate columns (1) and (4) from Table 3 using unadjusted pay but for a somewhat smaller sample, reflecting cases where we are unable to compute risk-adjusted pay because of lack of data on CEO wealth. The dependent variable in columns (3)- (6) is the logarithm of risk-adjusted pay, assuming constant relative risk-aversion (rra) coefficients of two and three. After controlling for firm, ownership, and board characteristics, the implied U.S. pay premium falls from 27% (with no risk adjustment in column (2)) to statistically insignificant premiums of 14% and 10% in columns (4) (rra = 2) and (6) (rra = 3), respectively. Importantly, in columns (3) and (5) in Table 5 , we show that the U.S. pay premium remains economically and statistically sizeable at 55% and 46% when we risk-adjust pay but do not control for differences in firms' shareholder base and board structure.
Panel A of Figure 2 shows the international distribution of predicted 2006 CEO risk-adjusted pay, following the Hall and Murphy (2002) In Panel A, risk-adjusted pay is estimated using the Hall-Murphy approach, defined as the amount of riskless cash compensation the CEO would exchange for his new stock and option grants, conditional on his wealth. In Panel B, the risk-adjusted pay is estimated using the Conyon-Core-Guay approach, defined as the dollar amount of compensation minus the riskless cash compensation the CEO would demand in exchange for his wealth for one more year. The risk-adjusted accounting-based bonuses are assumed to be 80% of actual bonuses. The CEO's safe wealth is assumed to be the maximum between $5 million and four times total pay. Certainty equivalents are estimated numerically assuming that the CEO has constant relative risk aversion (rra) of 2 or 3, and assuming that the distribution of stock prices over the actual term of the options granted is lognormal with volatility σ and expected return value (r f +β(r m −r f )−σ 2 /2)T , where σ and β are determined using monthly stock-return data over thirty-six months, r f is the country-specific average yield on government securities during the year of grant, and r m −r f = 6.5% is the market risk premium. Variable definitions and sources are in Table A1 (see Appendix) . Regressions include industry dummy variables based on twelve Fama-French industries. Robust t-statistics in parentheses are based on standard errors clustered by country. * * * , * * , * denote that the coefficient is significant at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.
based on the specification in column (3) of Table 5 , with the "U.S. dummy" replaced with a set of fourteen country dummies. The figure shows that the U.S. estimated pay using the "certainty equivalence" approach is $2.1 million, which is statistically higher than non-U.S. average risk-adjusted pay of $1.46 million. Panel B of Figure 2 shows risk-adjusted pay levels per country controlling for firm, ownership, and board characteristics, based on the specification in column (4) of Table 5 . CEO pay in the United States is significantly less than CEO pay in the United Kingdom and Australia, and insignificantly different from CEO pay in Canada, Italy, Ireland, and Switzerland. (2011), we now define risk-adjusted CEO pay as the dollar amount of compensation minus the riskless cash compensation the CEO would demand in exchange for holding his "total wealth" (defined as the market value of stock held plus the intrinsic "in-the-money" value of options held at fiscal year-end) for one more year instead of liquidating it. Specifically, we take a CEO that has non-firm-related wealth of w and holds a portfolio S(·) of company shares equal to "total wealth" divided by the year-end share price. We calculate the "certainty equivalent" V that the CEO would need to be awarded in cash to be indifferent between holding the firm shares or liquidating the firm's share holdings. We assume that w and V are invested at the risk-free rate, r f , that the realized stock price at T =1 is P 1 , and that the CEO's wealth at time T =1 is W 1 ≡ (w +V )(1+r f )+s(P 1 ). If, instead, the CEO were able to liquidate the firm's share holdings and invest in the risk-free asset, the CEO's wealth at time T =1 would be Z 1 = (w +s(P 0 ))(1+r f ).We then calculate the "certainty equivalent" V that equates the expected utility U (W 1 )f (P 1 )dP 1 = U (Z 1 ) assuming the same power utility function, U (W 1 ), and the distribution of future stock prices, f (P 1 ), as in our implementation of Hall and Murphy (2002) above. Risk-adjusted CEO pay is then defined as the dollar amount of compensation minus the riskless cash compensation V for holding the CEO's portfolio of firm shares. The certainty equivalents are estimated numerically assuming that the CEO has constant relative risk aversion (rra) of two or three and assumptions similar to Table 5 , Panel A, columns (3)-(6), in terms of safe wealth and the distribution of stock prices (risk-free, beta, equity risk premium) but over a horizon of one year. Columns (1)-(4) of Panel B of Table 5 present the results. We also consider the median risk premium for holding incentives that Conyon, Core, and Guay (2011) estimate in their Table 5 , which corresponds to a risk premium of 5.8% of beginning-of-year portfolio stock and options (which we measure as "total wealth"), as an alternative to the CEO-specific calculation. In this case, we calculate risk-adjusted pay by subtracting 5.8% of the CEO's "total wealth." Columns (5)-(6) of Panel B of Table 5 present the results. 17 In columns (1), (3), and (5) we find that the implied U.S. pay premium remains economically and statistically sizeable at 72%, 51%, and 41% when we risk-adjust pay but do not control for differences in firms' characteristics. After controlling for firm, ownership, and board characteristics we find an economically modest implied U.S. pay premium of 30% in column (2) and statistically insignificant premiums of 18% and 0% in columns (4) and (6).
The conclusions from Table 5 are robust to the risk-adjustment method as well as to alternative definitions of safe wealth, equity premiums, and option terms: under all specifications, the implied U.S. pay premium is monotonically decreasing in risk aversion, and becomes insignificant at relatively low levels of risk aversion after controlling for firm, ownership, and board characteristics. Calculating more precise estimates of risk-adjusted compensation for individual CEOs requires data unavailable to us, including details of CEO outside wealth and measures of individual risk aversion. Nonetheless, we consider the results in Table 5 to be consistent with Conyon, Core, and Guay's (2011) conclusion that part of the U.S. pay premium reflects compensating differentials for the higher risk of U.S. pay packages. These risk adjustments, however, reduce but do not eliminate observed U.S. pay premiums unless we also control for differences in ownership and board structures.
Are CEO pay determinants different for U.S. and non-U.S. firms?
The estimates for the U.S. pay and equity premiums in Tables 3 and 4 are based on a pooled regression where we restrict the coefficients on the industry, firm, ownership, and board controls to be the same across all countries. Table 6 explores differences across U.S. and non-U.S. firms in terms of the determinants of the level and structure of CEO pay. Columns (1)- (2) and (4)- (5) use the same specifications as in columns (4) and (6), respectively, of Table 3 but without including the U.S. dummy as a regressor. The p-values in columns (3) and (6) are based on regressions with interactions of each variable with the U.S. dummy and indicate the significance of the difference between the U.S. coefficients in columns (1) and (4) with the corresponding non-U.S. coefficients in columns (2) and (5). In comparing columns (1) and (2), the relation between CEO pay, firm size, and leverage is significantly stronger in the United States, while the relation between CEO pay and Tobin's q is significantly weaker. CEO pay is positively related to board size outside the United States (but not in the United States), while CEOs also serving as board chairs, and CEOs serving in firms with more independents on the board of directors, receive higher pay in the United States (but not outside the United States). In comparing columns (4) and (5), the fraction of pay delivered in the form of stock or options is positively related to board independence in the United States, but not outside the United States. Country fixed effects estimates (untabulated) using the sample of non-U.S. firms are similar to those in columns (2) and (5).
The estimated coefficients in Table 6 suggest an alternative way to evaluate the U.S. premium without restricting the regression coefficients to be the same for U.S. and non-U.S. firms. For each U.S. CEO, we use the CEO's industry, firm, ownership, and board characteristics to compute the CEO's hypothetical pay (using the coefficients from the non-U.S. regression in column (2) of Table 6 ), thus measuring the expected pay of that same CEO if he were in a non-U.S. firm with the same characteristics. The implied U.S. premium can be measured as the percentage difference between the actual and hypothetical pay for the U.S. CEOs. The actual (U.S.) pay exceeded the hypothetical (non-U.S.) pay for 70% of the U.S. CEOs, with an average implied U.S. pay premium of 40%. Similarly, we compare the hypothetical pay for non-U.S. CEOs (using (6) are run for a pooled regression using a sample of U.S. and non-U.S. firms that include interaction variables of all variables with U.S. dummy and p-values indicating whether the coefficient of a variable for U.S. firms is significantly different from the coefficient for non-U.S. firms. Variable definitions and sources are in Table A1 (see Appendix) . Robust t-statistics in parentheses are based on standard errors clustered by country (for non-U.S. regressions) and by industry (for U.S. regressions). * * * , * * , * denote that the coefficient is significant at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.
the coefficients from the U.S. regression in column (1) of Table 6 ) to the actual pay to estimate the implied U.S. premium for non-U.S. CEOs. We find that the hypothetical (U.S.) pay exceeded the actual (non-U.S.) pay for 59% of the non-U.S. CEOs, with an average implied U.S. pay premium of 21%. These numbers suggest that our finding of a positive U.S. CEO pay premium of 26% in column (4) of Table 3 is not driven by our assumption of equal coefficients. We have shown that the U.S. CEO pay premium is economically modest when we control for firm, ownership, and board characteristics, but without including country-level variables routinely used in international studies of corporate governance to measure differences in the economic, law, and institutional environment of each country. The limited number of countries in our sample (fourteen) limits the statistical degrees of freedom for reliably identifying country-level determinants of pay practices. In unreported analysis, we find that CEO equity-based pay (and total pay) is more prevalent in commonlaw countries (La Porta et al. 1998 ) like the United States as well as the United Kingdom, Australia, Canada, Ireland, and South Africa. CEO pay is also higher in countries with stronger investor protections and private control of self-dealing (Djankov et al. 2008) . We also consider different aspects of a country's regulatory environment. We find a positive association between CEO equity-based pay (and total pay) and the levels of compensation disclosure and director liability (La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, and Shleifer 2006); note that the United States scores high in both indices. We find that equity-based pay is lower in countries with friendlier collective labor laws and countries where labor unions are more powerful (Botero et al. 2004 ), such as in continental European countries (e.g., France and Germany).
The Internationalization (and Americanization) of CEO Pay
Many of the companies in our non-U.S. sample are large multinational corporations competing in the global market for capital, customers, and managerial talent. In this section, we analyze the extent to which such global competition affects the level and structure of CEO pay outside the United States. In particular, we analyze whether the U.S. pay and equity pay premiums exist when U.S. firms are compared with non-U.S. multinationals. We use two approaches to identify multinationals: internationalization (foreign institutional ownership, foreign investor demand, foreign sales, and the international diversity of the board of directors) and Americanization (U.S. institutional ownership, U.S. cross-listings, U.S. acquisitions, and directors with U.S. board experience). 18
CEO pay in internationalized firms
Panel A of Table 7 shows how internationalization affects the level and structure of CEO pay in non-U.S. companies. The regressions include the firm, ownership, and board characteristics in Table 3 , except that institutional ownership is now separated into two components: domestic and foreign institutional ownership. The regressions include four measures of internationalization: (i) foreign institutional ownership; (ii) a dummy variable indicating whether the firm is included in the 1,500-firm MSCI All Country World Index (routinely used as a benchmark for global equity mutual funds and used here as a proxy for foreign investor demand); (iii) foreign sales as a Table 3 , column 4. We add controls for internationalization and Americanization. Variable definitions and sources are in Table A1 (see Appendix). Robust t-statistics in parentheses are based on standard errors clustered by country. * * * , * * , * denote that the coefficient is significant at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. fraction of total sales; and (iv) the number of different nationalities represented on the board of directors divided by the total board size. Column (1) of Table 7 shows that the positive relation between CEO pay and institutional ownership documented in Table 5 is driven by foreign ownership. Overall, pay levels are positively and significantly related to all four internationalization variables. CEO pay is positively correlated to foreign institutional ownership, MSCI index membership, fraction of foreign sales, and the board's international diversity. The fraction of total compensation awarded in the form of stock and options is positively related to both domestic and foreign institutional ownership; the difference in the two coefficients is not significant. In addition, the fraction of equity pay is 5.8% higher for firms in the MSCI index; the use of equity pay is not significantly related to foreign sales or the board's international diversity. Figure 3 plots the implied U.S. pay and equity pay premiums for subsets of non-U.S. firms based on our four internationalization variables. The U.S. premiums are derived by estimating the U.S. dummy variable in Equation (1) for pay premiums (in Panel A) and Equation (2) for equity pay premiums (in Panel B) after controlling for firm, ownership, and board characteristics and using all U.S. CEOs and subsets of non-U.S. CEOs. The subsets for foreign institutional ownership, foreign sales, or board international diversity are defined based on whether each variable is above the 75th percentile for non-U.S. firms, while the subsets for MSCI membership are based on whether the firm is included in the MSCI index. As shown in Panel A, the U.S. pay premium is insignificant for Table 3 , column (4), for pay levels (converted into percentages) and column (6) for equity pay (in percentages), where the U.S. sample is compared with two subsets of the non-U.S. sample (number in brackets) based on the following measures of internationalization: MSCI Membership: "Yes" indicates that the non-U.S. firm is a member of the MSCI All-Country World Index. Foreign Institutional Ownership: "High" indicates that foreign institutional ownership is above the 75th percentile for non-U.S. firms. Foreign Sales: "High" indicates that the firm's foreign sales (expressed as a percentage of total sales) are above the 75th percentile for non-U.S. firms. Board International Diversity: "High" indicates that the ratio of the number of different nationalities of directors to board size is above the 75th percentile for non-U.S. firms. * * * , * * , * indicate that the coefficient on the U.S. dummy on each underlying regression depicted above is significant at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. all subsets of "internationalized" firms and significantly positive for all subsets of "non-internationalized" firms. Panel B shows that U.S. equity pay premium is insignificant for all subsets of internationalized firms.
CEO pay in Americanized firms
Panel B of Table 7 analyzes how the level and structure of CEO pay in non-U.S. companies are affected by explicit exposure to U.S. capital, product, and labor markets (as opposed to exposure to "foreign" markets generally). The regressions again include the firm, ownership, and board characteristics in Table 3 . In addition, the regressions include four measures of Americanization: (i) U.S. institutional ownership to measure the differential effect of U.S. and non-U.S. ownership; (ii) a dummy variable indicating whether the firm is cross-listed on U.S. exchanges, which we use as a proxy for demand by U.S. investors; 19 (iii) the total acquisitions of U.S. companies between 1996 and 2005, expressed as a percentage of market capitalization, as a proxy for exposure to U.S. product and labor markets; and (iv) the fraction of directors who also sit on boards of companies headquartered in the United States, as a proxy for exposure to U.S. pay practices.
As shown in column (3) of Table 7 , the level of pay for non-U.S. CEOs is positively and significantly related to U.S. institutional ownership, but not to institutional ownership from other countries: a 10% increase in U.S. institutional ownership is associated with approximately a 16% (i.e., 0.1(e 0.967 −1) = 0.16) increase in CEO pay. In addition, CEO pay is 21% higher (i.e., e 0.188 −1= 0.21) in firms cross-listed on U.S. exchanges, and it is also higher for non-U.S. companies acquiring U.S. firms (and, presumably, a U.S.-based workforce) as well as with boards where directors also serve on the board of U.S. firms. Column (4) shows that the use of equity pay in non-U.S. firms is higher in firms cross-listed on U.S. exchanges, higher in firms with more institutional ownership (but there is no statistical difference between U.S. and non-U.S. ownership), and higher in firms that made more U.S. acquisitions. Equity pay, however, is not higher in firms where directors have more U.S. board experience. Figure 4 plots the implied U.S. premiums for subsets of non-U.S. firms based on our four Americanization variables, defined again by estimating the U.S. dummy variable in Equations (1) or (2) after controlling for firm, ownership, and board characteristics and using all U.S. CEOs and subsets of non-U.S. CEOs. The subsets for U.S. institutional ownership, U.S. acquisitions, and U.S. board exposure are defined based on whether each variable is above the 75th percentile for non-U.S. firms, while the subsets for cross-listings are based on whether the firm is cross-listed on U.S. exchanges. As shown in Figure 4 , the U.S. pay premium (Panel A) is insignificant for all subsets of Americanized firms and significantly positive for all subsets of non-Americanized firms.
The results from Figure 4 imply that the differences in the level and structure of CEO pay for U.S. and non-U.S. firms are driven by non-U.S. firms with low exposure (or no exposure) to U.S. capital, product, or labor markets. To put it differently: after controlling for firm, ownership, and board characteristics, there is no discernible difference between the pay of U.S. CEOs and non-U.S. firms that are cross-listed in the United States, have high levels of U.S. institutional ownership, own operations in the United States, or have board members who also sit on U.S. boards. Table 3 , column (4), for pay levels (converted into percentages) and column (6) for equity pay (in percentages), where the U.S. sample is compared with two subsets of the non-U.S. sample (number in brackets) based on the following measures of Americanization: U.S. Institutional Ownership: "High" indicates that U.S. institutional ownership is above the 75th percentile for non-U.S. firms. Cross-Listed on U.S. Exchange: "Yes" indicates that a non-U.S. firm is cross-listed on a U.S. exchange. U.S. Acquisitions: "High" indicates that the volume acquisitions of U.S. companies over the prior ten years (expressed as a percentage of market capitalization) are above the 75th percentile for non-U.S. firms. Directors on U.S. Boards: "High" indicates that the fraction of directors of non-U.S. firms who also sit on boards of U.S. firms is above the 75th percentile. * * * , * * , * indicate that the coefficient on the U.S. dummy on each underlying regression depicted above is significant at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.
Why do Americanized firms adopt U.S. pay practices?
Non-U.S. firms may adopt U.S.-style pay packages to compete directly for talent in the global managerial labor market. The "competitive pay package" for U.S. executives has evolved to include large grants of stock and options and high overall levels of expected total compensation. Foreign firms attempting to attract executives in competition with equivalent U.S. firms will need to offer packages that are competitive with U.S. levels. This explanation for U.S.-style pay packages in non-U.S. firms is limited by the fact that very few companies outside the United States appoint executives from the United States (perhaps precisely because they are so costly). 20 However, while few non-U.S. firms hire American CEOs, U.S. firms are increasingly hiring non-native CEOs, which in turn affect competitive packages for CEOs outside the United States who might be attracted by U.S. firms. 21 Potentially more interesting are our results related to exposure to the U.S. capital market. In particular, we find that companies with higher U.S. institutional investment that are cross-listed on U.S. exchanges adopt U.S.-style packages. In a survey paper, Karolyi (2010) identifies the key trade-off that firms face when they cross-list their stocks on the U.S. stock market to have access to a larger capital market versus the additional regulatory and legal burdens that come with the listing. Stulz (1999) and the empirical work that has followed it (e.g., Doidge, Karolyi, and Stulz 2004) suggest that cross-listing firms benefit from "bonding" themselves to an increased level of disclosure and scrutiny in order to comply with U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) regulations and U.S. Generally Accepted Accounting Principles (GAAPs). One of those mechanisms could be implementing U.S.-style compensation packages that align executive incentives more with shareholder interests. This would predict that cross-listed firms use more equity-based pay, and this could be an important factor to attract U.S. and other foreign minority shareholders. 22 Another possibility is that CEOs of cross-listed firms would demand higher pay to compensate for the additional legal risk associated with the exposure to the U.S. securities law (Gerakos, Piotroski, and Srinivasan 2010) . However, this last channel would predict that the increase in pay for CEOs would come not in the form of increased grants of equity-based pay but rather in increases in "safe" base salary.
In a similar vein, U.S. shareholders could demand performance-based executive compensation as a prerequisite of investment. Consistent with this explanation is our result that the adoption of U.S.-style packages is especially likely when the directors also sit on U.S. boards (with more direct exposure to U.S. shareholders). A more cynical explanation-also consistent with our data-is that CEOs outside the United States use their U.S.-based investors as an "excuse" to increase the level of their pay by adding stock and options (often without reducing base salaries or other forms of safer pay). Since our primary purpose here is to develop and document the facts, we leave their interpretation to interesting future research.
Time Trends in the U.S. CEO Pay Premium, 2003-2008
In this section, we study the convergence of U.S. and non-U.S. pay, based on a time series of available data from 2003 to 2008. Panel A of Table 8 presents estimates of the U.S. CEO pay and equity pay premiums by year, obtained from estimating the regressions separately for each year controlling only for industry and size. The U.S. pay premium estimate of 79% in 2006 is identical to that in column (1) from Table 3 (converted into percentages using e US Dummy −1), and is based on our sample consisting of 1,532 U.S. firms and 1,480 non-U.S. firms. The estimates for the other years are based on smaller samples ranging between 781 and 997 non-U.S. firms per year. The smaller sample reflects time trends in disclosure rules and BoardEx coverage, and the fact that our hand-collected sample (focused primarily on Canada, Australia, and South Africa) covered only the 2006 fiscal year. We find that the U.S. pay premiums fell over the 2003-2008 period, especially after 2005. However, the estimates for both the U.S. pay and equity pay premiums adjusting only for firm size are significant in every year.
Panel B of Table 8 shows year-by-year results when we control for firm, ownership, and board characteristics. The U.S. pay premium estimate of 26% for 2006 is identical to that of column (4) of Table 3 . The estimates for the U.S. pay premium are smaller every year relative to Panel A; thus, we confirm that controlling for ownership and board structure helps explain the U.S. pay premium. In addition, in 2007 and 2008, the pay premiums are statistically insignificant (at 2% and 14%). This indicates that there have been no significant differences between pay levels of U.S. and non-U.S. CEOs since 2006. Similarly, there is no statistical difference between U.S. and non-U.S. firms in the use of equity-based pay for 2006 and 2007, although there is a modest gap in 2008. These time trends indicate that there has been a significant convergence of CEO pay between U.S. and non-U.S. firms.
Regressions in Panel B of Table 8 allow for different slope coefficients and different firm samples in each year as the coverage of firms changes over time. Therefore, it is difficult to compare U.S. pay premium estimates across years because of different slopes and different samples. First, we examine whether the observed convergence over time in U.S. and non-U.S. CEOs' pay level is due to changes in slopes. Panel C presents estimates of the U.S. pay premium by year from a pooled regression using the whole sample of years, which imposes constant slopes across years. We still find that the U.S. pay premium drops from 2003 to 2008 and conclude that the convergence in pay is not due to changes in slopes of the determinants of pay.
Second, we examine the effect of using different samples across year in the estimates of the U.S. pay premium. Panel D of Table 8 presents estimates of yearly regressions using a sample of firms for which there are data on CEO pay (and control variables) for every year from 2003 to 2008. The constant sample consists of 898 U.S. firms and 513 non-U.S. firms. The estimated U.S. pay Table 3 , converted into percentages). Panel B shows estimated U.S. dummy coefficients from year-by-year regressions controlling for sales and industry dummies, firm, ownership, and board characteristics (the 2006 column for "Implied U.S. Pay Premium" corresponds to column (4) of Table 3 premium is more moderate for this set of firms in 2003 and is insignificant in more recent years, which is consistent again with a time convergence of CEO pay to U.S. levels. Finally, we estimate the U.S. pay premium using both a pooled regression and a fixed sample of firms. Panel E of Table 8 presents estimates that can be directly compared across years. We observe a downward trend in the U.S. pay premium over the sample period, and there are no significant differences between pay levels of U.S. and non-U.S. CEOs after 2005. This finding suggests that it is time variation in firm characteristics that explains the decline in the U.S. pay gap.
In untabulated results, we analyze the time series of the determinants of CEO pay and conclude that an increase in institutional ownership seems to be the main factor associated with the time convergence in CEO pay levels. The average institutional ownership in non-U.S. firms increases from 18% to 34% over the sample period. Foreign ownership is a major contributor for this increase in institutional ownership, with an increase from 6% to more than 15%. Other firm and board characteristics do not exhibit significant trends. We conclude that the convergence of U.S. and non-U.S. CEO pay levels since 2003 seems to be associated with the convergence of ownership structures and globalization of capital markets.
Ownership, Governance, and CEO Pay
Our finding that the U.S. pay premium is modest occurs only in specifications where we control for institutional ownership and (to a lesser extent) insider ownership and board composition. This result, however, does not imply that institutional ownership and board structures cause high levels of CEO pay, since our (endogenous) ownership and governance variables may be proxying for, or correlated with, omitted factors also related to pay.
In this section, we analyze further the relation between our ownership and governance variables and the level and structure of CEO pay. We begin by exploring a variety of channels potentially linking ownership and governance to pay levels. We argue that institutional owners and independent boards demand higher-ability CEOs and impose more turnover and compensation risk, which in turn raises pay. Second, we show that the empirical relation between ownership, governance, and CEO pay holds when estimating separate regressions for U.S. and non-U.S. firms, suggesting that our control variables are not simply a substitute for the U.S. dummy in our previous analyses. Third, we show that the empirical relations hold in panel regressions with firm fixed effects, suggesting that our result is not driven by unobservable time-invariant firm characteristics. Finally, we argue (and cannot reject) that our results could be driven in part by time-varying omitted factors such as the increasing "professionalism" or Americanization of non-U.S. firms.
Why shareholder-centric governance might lead to higher CEO pay
The ownership and governance variables associated with higher CEO payinstitutional ownership and board independence-are routinely used as proxies for strong shareholder monitoring and good corporate governance. While it may seem counterintuitive that such "shareholder-centric" governance leads to higher (rather than lower) expected pay, the positive association can be both rational and efficient.
First, institutions and independent boards routinely press for tighter links between CEO pay and shareholder performance. As shown in Tables 3, 5, 6 , and 7, institutional ownership (especially by U.S. institutions) is associated with more equity-based pay as well as higher total pay. In contrast, we find that insider ownership is associated with less equity-based pay and lower total pay. Table 6 also shows that equity-based and total pay are positively related to the fraction of independent directors in U.S. firms. Since risk-averse CEOs demand a "risk premium" for accepting stock or stock options in lieu of safer forms of compensation, it follows that expected pay levels will be higher in firms with more equity-based pay. As shown in Table 5 , adjusting for risk reduces but does not eliminate the positive relation between CEO pay and institutional ownership. 23 Second, institutions and independent boards increase the risk of performance-related terminations, adding to the risk premium demanded by risk-averse CEOs. Prior studies like Weisbach (1988) show that the probability of CEO terminations following poor performance increases with the fraction of independent board members. In an international study covering firms in twenty-three countries between , Aggarwal et al. (2011 show that CEO turnover-performance sensitivity increases with the fraction of shares held by institutions using a similar sample to the one used in this paper. Lel and Miller (2008) document increased CEO turnover-performance sensitivities for non-U.S. firms that are cross-listed on U.S. exchanges, in line with our "Americanization" results in Section 3.
More broadly, Aggarwal et al. (2011) find a positive association between institutional ownership and a variety of shareholder-friendly governance attributes, namely board composition and anti-takeover provisions, and conclude that changes in institutional ownership drive subsequent changes in governance. These findings suggest that CEOs in firms with high institutional ownership are pressed to perform and are less able to enjoy the "quiet life" (Bertrand and Mullainathan 2003) . Therefore, institutional ownership causes the CEO to take some actions that he would not have taken otherwise (e.g., working harder, downsizing, shareholder distributions, selling the firm). The CEO will naturally require a compensating differential for taking the actions that he otherwise would not have taken.
Do omitted variables explain both pay and shareholder-centric
governance? 5.2.1 Shareholder-centric governance as a proxy for U.S. firms. As suggested by Table 1 , there are significant differences in ownership and governance characteristics between U.S. and non-U.S. firms, with U.S. firms exhibiting higher institutional ownership and more independent boards. Therefore, our finding that institutional ownership and board structure largely "explain" the U.S. pay premium might reflect the high correlations between these variables and the U.S. dummy variable, and not correlations between these variables and CEO pay.
In Section 2.4, we have explored differences across U.S. and non-U.S. firms in terms of the determinants of the level and structure of CEO pay. In comparing columns (1) and (2) of Table 6 , we find that the relation between institutional ownership and both CEO pay and the use of equity-based pay is significantly positive for both U.S. and non-U.S. firms. CEO pay and the use of equity-based pay are positively related to board composition for U.S. firms (but not for non-U.S. firms). Overall, while the results in Table 6 reveal some differences in the determinants of the level and structure of CEO pay in U.S. and non-U.S. firms, our finding that the U.S. pay premium is modest after controlling for ownership and board characteristics does not appear to be driven by the correlation between these characteristics and the U.S. dummy variable. Tables 3,  5 , 6, and 7 are consistent with the hypothesis that increases in institutional ownership and board independence lead to higher CEO pay, the results are also consistent with the existence of omitted variables correlated with ownership and board structure, as well as CEO pay. To the extent that these characteristics are specific to a firm, industry, or country but do not change over time, we can control for them with firm fixed effects using pooled cross-sectional time-series (panel) data. Table 9 reports coefficients from ordinary least squares regressions, with and without firm fixed effects, based on the panel data described and analyzed in Section 4. 24 Columns (1) and (3) report coefficients from estimating regressions in Equations (1) and (2) with the 2003-2008 panel, after excluding the U.S. dummy but including year fixed effects. We find that both CEO pay and the fraction of equity-to-total pay are higher in firms with higher institutional ownership and board independence, and lower in firms with higher insider ownership, in the panel data. 25 Columns (2) and (4) include firm fixed effects to control for time-invariant factors specific to a particular firm. We find that increases in CEO pay are associated with increases in institutional ownership and board independence, and decreases in insider ownership. Increases in the use of equity-based pay are positively related to increases in institutional ownership and negatively related to increases in insider ownership, and weakly related to changes in board structure. While not disproving the existence of timevariant omitted factors correlated with ownership, board structure, and CEO pay, the fixed-effects results indicate that our ownership and board variables are not merely proxying for omitted time-invariant firm characteristics.
Panel regressions with firm fixed effects. While the results in
CEO pay and the rise of professional executives.
The fixedeffects regressions in the prior section control for omitted time-invariant firm characteristics, but do not control for time-variant omitted factors that might be correlated with both CEO pay and shareholder-centric governance. Table A1 (see  Appendix) . Robust t-statistics in parentheses are based on standard errors clustered by country. * * * , * * , * denote that the coefficient is significant at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.
One potential time-variant omitted factor is the increasing importance of "professional executives" in firms outside the United States. The early 1900s witnessed the emergence of large publicly traded corporations in the United States with complex management structures that often displaced owner-managed and family-founded enterprises (Wells 2010) . Accompanying the rise in the widely held corporation was the emergence of "professional executives"-non-owners (or non-family members) hired to manage the firm's assets on behalf of dispersed shareholders. The conflicts arising between the owners of large publicly traded corporations and their hired executives is the "agency problem" explored by Berle and Means (1932) and Jensen and Meckling (1976) . As documented by Murphy (forthcoming), attempts to mitigate these problems in the United States included restricted and qualified stock options (encouraged by favorable tax subsidies), stock appreciation rights and nonqualified stock options, restricted stock grants, performance shares, and myriad other equity-based pay plans. The lure of exceptional rewards for exceptional performance attracted the best-andbrightest U.S. college graduates, and also facilitated the escalation of Masters of Business Administration programs in America's top universities. The relative importance of equity as a fraction of total compensation exploded in the 1990s, driven (in part) by the rise in shareholder activism and the increasing importance of institutional shareholders (who, by the 1990s, owned the majority of shares of large U.S. corporations). 26 While firms outside the United States continue to be dominated by founding families and groups, there has been a nascent international trend toward "professional executives" and what we have called "Americanized" firms. In fact, Panel D of Table 2 shows that, as of 2006, CEOs of non-U.S. firms are more likely to be hired from outside than CEOs of U.S. firms. In addition, ownership structures have shifted substantially in the past decade in non-U.S. firms toward greater institutional ownership (Ferreira and Matos 2008; Aggarwal et al. 2011) . The simultaneous rise in institutional ownership and hiring and motivating professional managers could indeed be a potential explanation for the correlation between CEO pay and institutional shareholdings. 27
Conclusion
The high pay of U.S. CEOs relative to their foreign counterparts has been cited as evidence of excesses in U.S. pay practices. Our results, based on a comprehensive study of CEO pay across firms in fourteen countries with mandated disclosure rules, challenge the view that the level and structure of pay for U.S. CEOs is systematically different from that of non-U.S. CEOs.
First, we show that the alleged U.S. pay premium, after controlling for firm, ownership, and board characteristics, is economically modest. The premium has declined substantially since 2003 (58%), becoming economically modest by 2006 (26%) and statistically insignificant by 2007 (2%). We establish that international differences in corporate governance in terms of companies' ownership and board structures are important in cross-country studies of CEO pay level and mix.
Second, we argue that it is misleading to examine cross-sectional or crosscountry differences in the level of pay in isolation, without also examining differences in the structure of pay. The ownership and board characteristics associated with higher pay are also those associated with a larger fraction of pay awarded in the form of stock options or restricted stock. We find that CEO pay levels and the use of equity-based pay are positively related to proxies routinely used for better governance-namely, institutional ownership and independent boards. Unobserved firm heterogeneity does not explain the positive relation between CEO pay and shareholder-friendly governance, but we cannot rule out that the relation is explained by time-variant factors, such as the increasing importance of "professional executives."
Third, we show that risk adjustments reduce but do not eliminate observed U.S. pay premiums unless we also control for differences in ownership and board structures. The result that expected pay is higher in firms with higher institutional ownership and more independent boards, even after adjusting for the risk of equity-based pay, is not surprising. Institutions and independent boards increase the risk of performance-related terminations, adding to the risk premium demanded by risk-averse CEOs. Moreover, to the extent that institutions and independent boards force CEOs to work harder (or, more broadly, to take actions they would not take with less monitoring).
Finally, we find convergence toward U.S. pay practices by non-U.S. firms that have a higher fraction of foreign sales and shares held by foreign institutional investors and internationally diverse boards. Similarly, we find that CEO pay in non-U.S. firms is no different (compared with U.S. firms) in the non-U.S. firms that are cross-listed on a U.S. exchange, have a high presence of U.S. institutions as shareholders, have U.S. operations, or have directors who also serve on U.S. boards. Our results indicate that U.S.-style equity-based compensation is increasingly exported to non-U.S. firms that are exposed to foreign (and particularly U.S.) capital, product, and managerial labor markets. These findings suggest an increasingly important international managerial labor market for CEOs. 
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